Citizens
of London
The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour
by Lynne Olson
EXCERPT
On a chilly night in early
1947, a tall, lanky American with tousled dark hair emerged from a theater in
London’s West End. Other playgoers, pouring into the street from nearby
theaters, stopped and stared. They had seen the man’s angular face and slightly
stooped frame in wartime newsreels and newspaper photographs, and most knew
immediately who he was. As he and two companions headed down Shaftesbury
Avenue, they were surrounded by a throng of people. “Good evening, Mr. Winant,”
several in the crowd said. A couple of men doffed their hats. One woman reached
out and shyly touched his coat.
For those gathered around
him, the sight of John Gilbert Winant conjured up memories of smoke-filled
nights in early 1941 when Winant, the American ambassador to Britain, walked the
streets of London during the heaviest raids of the Blitz, Germany’s nine-month
terror bombing of British cities. He asked everyone he met – firemen, dazed
victims, air wardens pulling bodies out of the rubble – what he could do to
help. In those perilous times, one Londoner remembered, Winant “convinced us
that he was a link between ourselves and millions of his countrymen, who, by
reason of his inspiration, spoke to our very hearts.”
Yet, while he was instantly
recognizable in Britain, few Americans had ever heard of Winant. Even fewer were
aware of the key role he had played in shaping and maintaining the alliance
between the United States and Britain in World War II. In future decades, that
extraordinary partnership – the closest and most successful wartime alliance in
history -- would come to be known as the “special relationship” that helped win
the conflict, preserve democracy, and save the world. As the years passed and
the legend surrounding the alliance took shape, the manner of its creation
seemed almost preordained: first, Winston Churchill rousing his nation to stand
alone against Hitler; then Franklin D. Roosevelt and America coming to the
rescue of Churchill and the British.
But in March 1941, when
Winant arrived in London to take up his post, such a happy ending was far from
certain. In the previous six months, the Luftwaffe had killed tens of thousands
of Britons in its attacks on London and other British cities. British armed
forces, which lacked adequate arms and ammunition, were on the defensive
everywhere. German submarines were operating at will in the Atlantic, sinking
vast amounts of merchant shipping and slowly strangling British supply lines.
Starvation for the civilian population loomed as a distinct possibility, as did
a cross-Channel invasion by Germany. “We were hanging on by our eyelids,”
recalled Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Britain’s top military leader during the
war. Winant himself would later write: “There were many times when one felt the
sands would run out and it all would be over.”
As the British well knew,
their only hope for salvation lay in American help. Yet that aid had been
miserly thus far, even as Britain’s future grew increasingly bleak. Many in
Washington had already written the country off. How could this little island, no
matter how glorious its military past, resist an invader that had toppled every
country in its path like so many duckpins? Among those who believed in Britain’s
inevitable defeat was Joseph P. Kennedy, Winant’s predecessor as U.S.
ambassador, who, along with several thousand other American residents of
Britain, fled to the United States at the height of the Blitz.
Winant, by contrast, made it
clear from the beginning that he was in the country to stay. “There was one man
who was with us, who never believed we would surrender, and that was John
Gilbert Winant,” noted Ernest Bevin, a leading figure in Churchill’s
government. Within days of the new ambassador’s arrival, an embassy subordinate
remarked, he had “conveyed to the entire British nation the sure feeling that
here was a friend.”
Winant, however, was not the
only American in London to take a critical role in encouraging the British and
pressing for an Anglo-American partnership. Two others – W. Averell Harriman and
Edward R. Murrow – were prominent actors in the drama as well. Harriman, the
aggressive, ambitious chairman of Union Pacific railroad, arrived in the British
capital soon after Winant to become administrator of U.S. Lend-Lease aid to
Britain. Murrow, the head of CBS News in Europe, had been stationed in the
British capital since 1937.
As the most important
Americans in London during the war’s early years, Winant, Harriman, and Murrow
were key participants in America’s debate over whether Britain, the last bastion
of freedom in Europe, should be saved. While Murrow championed the British cause
in his broadcasts to the American people, Harriman and Winant mediated between a
desperate prime minister and a cautious president, who was as wary of his
isolationist opponents at home as he was initially skeptical of Britain’s
chances. The famous friendship that developed between these dominating,
egocentric leaders – “two prima donnas,” Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s chief aide,
called them – was nowhere on the horizon at that point.
In the years since the war,
most of the attention and much of the credit for the triumph of the
Anglo-American alliance has been given to the intimate collaboration of
Roosevelt and Churchill. Much less carefully examined has been the vital part
played by men like Winant, Harriman, and Murrow in laying the groundwork for the
two leaders’ partnership, at a time when Roosevelt and Churchill not only were
strangers but were suspicious and even hostile toward each other.
Sent to London as Roosevelt’s
eyes and ears, Winant and Harriman were to evaluate Britain’s capacity for
resistance and survival. Both swiftly came to the conclusion that Britain would
hold out, and they made clear to Washington they stood with her. The two envoys
lobbied Roosevelt and his men to provide as much aid as possible and even to go
to war. In more veiled language, Murrow did the same in his broadcasts.
Knowing how important the
three men were to his country’s survival, Churchill courted them as relentlessly
as he would later woo Roosevelt. The prime minister had an open-door policy
where Murrow was concerned. Winant and Harriman became part of Churchill’s inner
circle, with unprecedented access to the prime minister and members of his
government. Rarely – before or since – has diplomacy been so personal. That
intimacy also extended to the Americans’ relationship with members of the prime
minister’s family. Indeed, so intense were their bonds with the Churchills that
Harriman, Winant, and Murrow all engaged in wartime love affairs with Churchill
family members.
When the Japanese bombed
Pearl Harbor and the United States finally entered the war, the three Americans’
resolute support of an alliance between their homeland and Britain finally came
to fruition. Their importance in the forging of that union can best be
illustrated by their whereabouts on December 7, 1941. While Winant and Harriman
were having dinner with Churchill at Chequers, Murrow was at the White House
with Roosevelt.
*
By all accounts, the scene
that wintry night at the prime minister’s country retreat was jubilant. As soon
as they heard the news about Pearl Harbor, all those present knew that their
long fight was over: America was now in the war. According to one observer,
Churchill and Winant did a little dance together around the room. But the
complex saga of the Anglo-American alliance had only just begun.
Despite the veneer of
collegiality painted by Churchill in his memoirs, the partnership was fragile
and fractious from the moment of its birth. The two countries may have shared a
common language and heritage, but their political and military leaders, from
Churchill and Roosevelt on down, possessed remarkably little understanding and
knowledge of each other. Ignorant of the other’s history and culture, both
allies tended to think of their cousins across the sea in stereotypes, with
scant appreciation for their respective political and military difficulties.
Suspicions, strains,
prejudices, and rivalries threatened to derail this new and unparalleled
confederation before it took hold. Such problems were exacerbated by British
condescension toward the Americans and U.S. resentment toward the British. As
Sir Michael Howard, a British military historian, has noted, “The British
approached the alliance from the point of view that the Americans had everything
to learn and the British were there to teach them. The Americans took the
approach that if anyone had anything to teach them, it was not the British who
had been beaten over and over again and were not a very good army.”
In this fraught environment,
the role of mediator took on new importance. While Roosevelt and Churchill took
justifiable pride in their close and direct communications with each other, both
Winant and Harriman continued to act as interpreters and peacemakers between the
leaders, explaining the thoughts and actions of one to the other. In addition,
Winant worked to alleviate tensions and promote cooperation among the two
countries’ other top military and government figures. According to The Times
of London, the American ambassador was the “adhesive” that helped to hold the
wartime alliance together. “It was not Mr. Winant who turned the cooperation of
the English-speaking peoples into the most intimate alliance recorded in
history,” the newspaper remarked after the war. “But it was Mr. Winant
who established and sustained the mutual understanding in the present – and
identity of aim for the future – which made such intimacy possible.”
Joining forces with Murrow
and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first commander of American forces in
Britain, Winant also sought to educate the citizens of the two countries about
each other, to smoothe away the misunderstandings and stresses that increasingly
cropped up as the war approached its climax. Those strains were especially felt
in war-straitened Britain, as Americans began arriving in massive numbers to
prepare for the invasion of Europe. By mid-1943, the American presence in London
– and the rest of Britain -- was overwhelming. Everywhere one looked, it seemed,
a new American air force base or army training camp was being built in a country
the size of Georgia or Michigan. The streets and pubs of the British capital,
meanwhile, were choked with thousands of brash, boisterous GIs on leave.
As the nerve center of Allied
planning for the war in Europe, London was the place to be in the early
1940s. “Blacked out, bombed out, expensive and hard to get around in, it was
still magnificent – the Paris of World War II,” observed one historian. Wealthy,
well-connected American civilians, from New York investment bankers to Hollywood
directors, vied to be assigned there on temporary government duty, rightly
considering it the most exciting, vibrant city in the world during that
tumultuous time.
Whether military or civilian,
the Americans in London and the rest of the country were paid far more and lived
considerably better than the great majority of the British, who struggled daily
with scarcity. The vast difference in Anglo-American living standards reflected
the profoundly different way in which the two allies experienced the war: one
country on the front line, suffering deprivation and hardship; the other
thousands of miles away from the battle, its citizens more prosperous than ever
before.
Such disparities caused
mounting tension, as did America’s flexing of its muscle as the larger and
stronger partner of the alliance. Late in World War II, the United States came
of age as the greatest economic, military, and political power in the world –
and in so doing, revealed an array of complexities and contradictions. On the
one hand, Roosevelt and his administration championed freedom, justice, and
equality for all nations. On the other hand, the U.S. government left no doubt
in the minds of the British -- and the smaller European countries in the larger
Western alliance -- that America was now in charge of running the war and that
it would dominate in the postwar world. “This is
an American-made victory,” the Chicago Tribune editorialized in 1944,
“and the peace must be an American peace.”
While keenly aware that
American intervention was rescuing them from Hitler, the British and other
Europeans viewed their saviors as throwing their weight around without regard
for the long-term international consequences of their actions. They saw an
arrogance there, a misguided sense of destiny on the part of the Americans,
who, having little knowledge of the globe beyond their borders and scant prior
experience in dealing with it, nonetheless planned to take it over and
single handedly set it to rights. A British woman who worked at U.S. naval
headquarters in wartime London used to tell her American co-workers that “they
needed to know more about the world before they could lead it.”
*
Throughout the war, Gil Winant and Ed Murrow, close friends who championed
postwar economic and social reform as well as international cooperation,
reflected America’s idealistic side. Averell Harriman, a tough-minded pragmatist
intent on broadening his own power and influence, as well as that of his
country, became an exemplar of U.S. exceptionalism. In the postwar era, it was
the world view of Harriman and others like him that dominated American foreign
policy. Along with such longtime friends and associates as Dean Acheson, Robert
Lovett, and John McCloy (collectively known as the “Wise Men”), Harriman worked
to create a Pax Americana throughout the globe.
In the decades that followed
the war, Winant’s approach to international relations – “to concentrate on the
things that unite humanity rather than on the things that divide it” – was
regarded as simplistic and naïve. Toughness was now the mantra, as America,
brandishing its military and economic might, set out to impose its own ideology
and ways of doing things on the rest of the world.
It didn’t take long, however,
for the world to rebel. Tired of being ordered about, other countries
increasingly rejected American leadership and, by the dawn of the twenty-first
century, many of them insisted on playing by their own rules. Facing a rapid
decline in the influence and power to which it had laid claim only sixty-odd
years before, the United States, with the advent of the administration of Barack
Obama, began to acknowledge the need to promote global cooperation rather than
solely American interests and to build true partnerships with other nations.
As it reaches out more to the
world, America might do well to look back at the success of the U.S.-British
alliance in World War II – and the yeoman work of Winant, Murrow, Eisenhower,
and others in holding it together when nationalism and other forces threatened
to tear it apart. Shortly after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Winant spoke at dedication ceremonies for a
monument in southeast England to honor the American forces who landed in France
on D-Day. In remarks broadcast by the BBC, the ambassador declared that if man
was to survive in this perilous new period, he “must learn to live together in
friendship,” to act “as if the welfare of a neighboring nation was almost as
important as the welfare of your own.” Winant acknowledged that the
accomplishment of such goals would be a supremely difficult task. “But,” he
added, “so was D-Day. If that could be done, anything can be done – if we really
care to do it.”
Copyright © Lynne Olson |